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Ethical Autonomism: The Work of Art as a Moral Agent
  Rob van Gerwen
Abstract
Much contemporary art seems morally out of control. Yet,
philosophers seem to have trouble finding the right way to
morally evaluate works of art. The debate between
autonomists and moralists, I argue, has turned into a
stalemate due to two mistaken assumptions. Against these
assumptions, I argue that the moral nature of a work's
contents does not transfer to the work and that, if we are to
morally evaluate works we should try to conceive of them as
moral agents. Ethical autonomism holds that art's autonomy
consists in its demand that art appreciators take up an artistic
attitude. A work's agency then is in how it merits their
audiences' attitudinal switch. Ethical autonomism allows for the
moral assessment of art works without giving up their
autonomy, by viewing artistic merit as a moral category and
art-relevant moral evaluation as having the form of art
criticism.
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1. Moral evaluation of art
It is no coincidence that artists who are on the front end of art,
like Stockhausen and Hirst, should compare the expressive
effects of the attack on the World Trade Centre with those that
even a masterpiece like Picasso's "Guernica" has. Within our
culture, art is considered to be a practice both important and
autonomous. Within the limits of art or in its name we endorse
events and actions that would be subject to judicial constraint
in everyday life. Some artists, however, in their search for the
front line, go a long way in what seems to be the wrong
direction. We might mention the Austrian Aktionskünstler,
Wolfgang Flatz, dropping a bull filled with fireworks from a
helicopter; or auto-mutilating performance artists; or Orlan
who, induced by no apparent physiological or psychological
accident, had her appearance rebuilt through plastic surgery,
to reflect facial traits of famous women from art history, such
as Botticelli's Venus, and Leonardo's Mona Lisa; or, Günther
von Hagens, a German self-acclaimed professor in anatomy
who applies artistic procedures to real human corpses, even
though the educational benefit of that is doubtful.[1] One can
think, also, of the recent boost in pornography in all layers of
art: think of the large pictures of Jeff Koons' Made in Heaven
series, rap singers posing as pimps, or French taboo-breaking
sex-novels.[2] Artists take their task of touching their audience
seriously, but, out of a jealousy of sorts of real life, in their
work they seem to think that being art is part of what hinders
their work in being effective. Hence their often rather
impertinent intrusions into real life.
The motivation to morally evaluate works of art seems to
follow no more than three routes. First, one may find out that
in the creating of a work immoral activities were involved. For
example, Bernardo Bertolucci supposedly had Marlon Brando
rape Maria Schneider in front of the camera, to make it look
more real (in Last Tango in Paris, 1973). Secondly, one may
assume that certain works cause immoral conduct, either
directly-e.g. a film showing sexual activities involving children
is nowadays condemned on the assumption that it will be used
by criminal paedophile networks to sustain their criminal
activities; or indirectly, if certain works are held to sustain
certain fantasies, which may eventually lead people to immoral
conduct. Motivations for moral condemnation such as these are
heteronomous, and fairly clear-cut. In contrast with their
denouncing a work because of actions preceding or following
upon it, one may, thirdly, morally denounce a work because of
what it is within the limits of art. These moral judgments are
my subject matter.
Philosophically, the position that I defend, ethical autonomism,
holds a middle ground between moralism and autonomism,
positions that have produced a stalemate in the relevant
contemporary debates and that seem unfit, due to certain
assumptions, to deal with cases such as those cited above. I
argue, contra moralism, that moral flaws in events represented
in works do not, as such, count morally against the artistic
merit of such works, since art assumes that the beholder takes
on an artistic attitude which allows him to think and feel
(morally) relevant thoughts about the represented without
being obliged to act according to these thoughts and feelings.
This is what I take art's autonomy to consist in (. . . in the
present historical constellation).
Contra autonomism, I argue that, since it is not morally neutral
for a person to have morally relevant thoughts and feelings
and not act according to them, i.e. to take on an artistic
attitude, by insisting that the beholder take on such an
attitude, a work can be conceived of as acting morally. This
rather abstract level of moral agency is then filled in by
reference to how material choices on the part of the artist have
perceptual and experiential consequences on behalf of the
audience. Works of art act upon their audiences, as members
of the moral species, i.e. they do not merely have causal
effects like a hurricane will, but make use of any such causal
effects inherent in artistic material to induce people to think
and feel certain things about events often morally profound.
This 'semantic agency' can be assessed morally, but only by
doing art criticism, because the nature of a work of art's
agency derives from just how it makes use of the potential
inhering the artistic material, the relevant art form, and genre,
and, more generally, art history and the work's social and
historical, i.e. non-artistic context.
2. A recent debate's assumptions
In a recent debate in The British Journal of Aesthetics more
than ten positions are put forward with regard to art-internal
moral evaluation.[3] This is a confused debate, though. The
confusion seems due to an old dualism in aesthetics: defenders
of autonomism are supposed to deny the inappropriateness of
moral evaluation, whereas one who defends moral evaluation
presumably denies art's autonomy. 'Moralists' point to the
moral nature of a work's represented contents, whereas
autonomists refer to a work's artisticity. No middle way seems
to be available.
The reciprocal exclusion of art's autonomy and art's moral
evaluation points to the premise that moral evaluation is about
propositions (those that are incorporated in or supported or
expressed by the work of art, or are caused in the work's
beholder).[4] The temptation to yield to this premise may be
due to the demand of universalizability inherent in the moral
stance. Yet both concentrating on a representation's contents
or, alternatively, neglecting those contents, leads one to
disregard many relevant aspects of works, thus adding to the
uneasy rapport between aesthetic and moral values. In
contrast, I submit that it is individual actions that form
morality's proper subject matter-albeit in the light of their
relevant similarities to other acts, which can be expressed in
propositions. Taking agency itself as the exemplary object of
moral judgement motivates my effort to treat works of art as
moral agents and their effects as the effects of an agency. I
hope that this provides an escape route for the aesthetic
dualism between autonomism and moralism.
Both these positions also share an enemy, radical moralism,
i.e. the shortsighted view that a work of art that conveys
morally objectionable actions is itself morally objectionable.
This view assumes that an event's moral qualities transfer to
its representation. Why does the radical moralist not object to
articles in the papers reporting murders and rapes? Maybe, he
feels that with journalistic reports the moral qualities of the
events do not transfer to their representation, because it is
journalism's moral task and primary performance to report
truthfully about the world at large. He might further argue that
art can be evaluated moralistically exactly because in it the
issue of truth is suspended.[5] "Who, in his sane mind, would
want to represent immoral deeds without any epistemological
necessity? This must be immoral of itself." What is being
overlooked by radical moralism is that works of art are to allow
their audiences to have an absorbing experience.[6] Works of
art do not have to tell the truth about anything, but this does
not mean that they can be judged in any way we please.
Works (have to) do other things: rather than relating to the
worlds they present to their audiences, they relate to their
audiences.
All positions in the named debate seem vehement, like I am,
on denying the viability of radical moralism. However, it is
evident from the names chosen by the 'moralists' among the
participants-which vary from modest to more modest
moralism-that they assume that what does radical moralism in
is its radicality.[7] Yet, what seems wrong with radical
moralism is its thesis of the flawless transfer of moral qualities
of events to their representation. This thesis mistakenly
positions the moment of judging external to the work that is
being experienced. It argues that we can do with a moral
evaluation of the world a work presents, without taking into
account that work itself.[8] Refusing to take a work in,
however, for whatever art-external considerations, is like
bombing a museum: it bashes all the objects in it, irrespective
of their aesthetic nature, let alone merit.
3. The nature of moral judgments of art
Berys Gaut's ethicism holds that moral defects of works of art
are pro tanto also aesthetic defects.[9] Gaut does not think
that some moral flaw can overrule all aesthetic merits, as the
moralist submits, but that art critical judging encompasses
aesthetic considerations as well as moral ones, and that both
together sustain the final critical verdict. The moral
considerations concern the attitudes that a work incorporates,
causes in its beholder or presupposes in its maker. Any moral
flaw in these attitudes can legitimately be held to diminish the
overall merit of the work.[10]
This criterion is elaborated in Gaut's "merited response
argument," which says that the relevant attitudes must be
merited. This is an interesting demand because, surely, not
just any attitude will be relevant for the assessment of a work
of art, but only those that are somehow appropriate to the
work. This, however, is not what Gaut means. He is not
interested in whether or not someone's pleasure in a
presentation of "sadistic cruelty" is merited by the relevant
novel, i.e. whether the novel is so good as to merit our
pleasure, so that the pleasure can be said to 'fit' the novel.
Gaut (on p. 194) calls such merits merely 'aesthetic'. Gaut,
rather, judges morally the pleasure itself, arguing that a
pleasure in "sadistic cruelty" can never be merited. That seems
wrongheaded on several counts.
First, the attitudes that some work of art really presupposes in
its audience may be more nuanced, subtler than Gaut makes
out, and they may not be morally objectionable even though
the attitudes the work contingently elicits in some one beholder
may be objectionable. Merely assessing the moral nature of
attitudes in the audience sidesteps the issue of these attitudes'
appropriateness to the work, which forms the core of the issue
of art-internal moral evaluation.
Secondly, when someone values positively the film Henry,
Portrait of a Serial Killer (John McNaughton, 1990), does this
mean that he applauds antisocial and addictive killing? If one
were to judge the film because one applauds killing, then one
would be judging on irrelevant grounds-perhaps to frighten off
one's friends. In such a case the verdict is not merited (in the
sense of: not induced) by the work. The history of aesthetic
theory is replete with warnings against such interested, or
sentimental judging.[11] If after (or by) seeing the film
someone were induced to actually kill and rape, surely this
would say more about his personality than about the (moral)
value of the film?[12]
There is, thirdly, a measure of psychological naivety in the
ethics of Gaut's merited response argument. When someone
enjoys a violent scene in a film that is morally to be
condemned, a rape for instance, this means that he apparently
has certain desires for actions that are morally to be
condemned, but, on my, broadly Kantian view this does not yet
mean that he fails morally-assuming that we take moral failure
to concern one's actions-let alone, and this seems crucial, that
the work which makes him conscious of the psychological
frictions in his experience of reality is to be condemned
because of it. Fantasies are better controlled once we are
conscious of them than by rejecting whatever brings them to
the fore. Art allows us to entertain fantasies in reflection, even
when we would rather not recognize them as ours. While thus
entertaining our fantasies, we are not supposed to activate
their complex psychological causality and to act upon them. If
one neglects the contingency of psychological reality, one
denies art's biggest potential: art can induce its audience to
experience something without having to act accordingly.
4. The work of art as a moral agent
With this, I return to the thought that moral judgments
primarily concern actions. If we are to morally judge works of
art, perhaps we must understand them as instances of moral
agency. For that to succeed, we must be able, first, to view
them as a realization of intentions of a moral mind, or minds.
Secondly, we must conceive of that realization as
psychologically real, i.e. as unaccountable without reference to
a psychology.[13] (We are not principally interested in the
strictly causal effects of works of art, nor merely in the
intentions.) Lastly, we must conceive of works as doing
something to their audiences (which on account of its semantic
causality can then be judged morally).
Of course, treating works of art as realizing intentions already
is (or should be) the standard approach to works. Even if we
get the feeling that certain aspects in a particular work were
introduced randomly, or via some mathematical algorithm, we
would still resort to the idea that a human mind decided to
leave these aspects where we found them, or to have the
algorithm produce this work. We will also standardly view a
work's intentional structure as the product of a human mind,
with a psychology connecting the manipulation of the material
in one particular work to other works the relevant person
produced, or to works of other artists, either contemporary or
from the past.[14] The last desideratum, of conceiving works
of art as doing something to their audiences is met by
acknowledging that works guide their beholders into thinking
and feeling specific things either along with the work or in
response to it.
Obviously, the work of art is not a moral agent in the full-
fledged sense in which a person is one. Persons have minds,
which enable them to respond spontaneously, and personal
psychologies, relating them internally to their parents and to
other persons from their pasts, whereas art works do not.
Sure, performers are persons with minds of their own, yet they
are not part of the work they present as the persons they are,
but, rather, as personas, defined in terms of the work (see
endnote 17). Works' psychologies-if we are allowed to use this
term in an extended sense-are a function of their makers'
psychologies, but irreducible to these and of a distinct nature.
When I call a work a moral agent, it is not in these respects. A
work of art is an agent in the one other crucial respect that it
acts upon persons. But if this agency isn't based in a mind, is a
work, then, a moral agent in some metaphorical sense? I don't
think so, as long as we realize that only the one aspect of
acting onto persons is referred to. In this restricted sense a
work of art is literally a moral agent. (I think the restriction is
justified by the acknowledgement that the core aspect of the
paradigm moral situation is the spatio-temporal continuum
between the agent and the person at the 'receiving' end of his
actions.) In contrast, whatever psychic life or expressiveness
an audience attributes to a work on account of how it is
addressed by the work, is based in this agency, but can hardly
be meant in the same literal way, for lack of the work's
sentience and of any concurrent second-person reciprocity.
If we are allowed to view the work of art as a moral agent,
what, then, shall we take its agency to consist in? The answer
to this question comes in two parts: one general, the other
particular.[15] Generally, a work of art mobilizes its beholder's
mind a priori by activating his body. The agency of particular
works is already determined by the phenomenological
restrictions on the beholder's perceptual apparatus and bodily
movements that come with the art form the work instantiates.
Paintings activate their beholder's bodies in ways different from
music performances or film projections. We confront a painting
in the room where it is exhibited at a particular distance; a jazz
performance in The Village Vanguard we can enjoy while
walking around in the room, for the music surrounds us. What
we see (of the musician) does not literally belong to the music
although it may inform us of what does. Film, lastly, is enjoyed
in a dark room, where one is seated in a fixed place.
The second, 'particular' aspect of a work's agency lies both in
its contents and the ways in which this is made lively and
plausible-a work's style. It makes a difference, for example,
whether in a film a fight between two men is shown in a
parsimonious way that enables one to recognize the impact,
both physically and morally, of being hit in the face, or more
explicitly by way of a number of kicks and slapping making it
look easy to deliver such blows, and not hurtful to receive
them, etc. The difference lies not merely in the events shown,
but, rather, in how they are shown. To understand how the
style of a work links up with the phenomenology of the
relevant art form, we must first address the autonomy of
artistic practice.
5. Autonomy and the artistic attitude
Art's autonomy is a fact of modern Western history. This
autonomy refers to the practice as a whole. We think it an
intrinsic value that there be such a practice (Art) where people
can entertain thoughts and feelings with regard to issues
deemed important, without immediately being affected by
these thoughts and feelings in more usual agent-related ways.
All works of art, qua art, partake in this autonomy. What turns
the moral evaluation of art into such a confusing issue is that
works that confront us in an engaging manner with moral
issues do so against the very background of this, art's moral
autonomy. It may appear an undue abstraction to state the
autonomy of the artistic practice as a whole, and to attribute it
to individual works of art only in so far as they are art, instead
of, contingently, in regard of their particular contents or
meaning. The way to grasp this is through the notion of the
artistic attitude. I give an imaginary example.
I am on my way from Utrecht to Amsterdam to visit the
Stedelijk Museum for an exhibit of installations, when a terrible
accident takes place, which fully blocks the road. I get stuck
and leave my car to see the stricken driver, pinned between his
seat and the deformed steering wheel: moaning, and bleeding
heavily. I realize immediately that I will never get to
Amsterdam in time to visit the exhibition, and decide to take
the situation I am confronted with as the installation I am not
going to see. I enter an artistic situation where some sort of
accident has taken place and the audience is asked to
empathize aesthetically. I let myself in to the work, and get
really absorbed (Carroll's term) in it. Intensely, I watch the
face of the main persona, the victim, wincing with pain, his
expressive gesturing. I notice the newspaper lying across the
wheel, and the cover story about huge fires in Indonesian
forests-the paper all crumpled, dirty and bloody. The victim's
blood gushes from his left shoulder. Its throbbing pulse, the
syrupy substance and its deep colours fascinate me. I
appreciate how the victim's blood mingles with the photograph
of the wounded face of one of the Indonesian fire's victims.
Both tragedies, of the accident and of the fire, mix into one.
The man in front of me brings the loneliness of the fire's victim
to life: a singular morally profound representation. A deep
sympathy overtakes me. More and more, I identify with the
suffering of humanity. This installation works, it has great
aesthetic merit, much like a great work does.
The reader probably agrees that my attitude in this story is
unfit, morally wrong. But why is it? It can hardly be the
problem that I do not treat the victim as a real man, because
actors and performers are real people too and we are supposed
to see them too as parts of works. All I do is things we are
supposed to do when aesthetically appreciating works of art; I
attentively watch the 'installation' from all angles, interpret it,
have it absorb me; I build experiential dimensions in my
imagination, find the aesthetic qualities of the 'installation',
make connections with relevant other circumstances. And I am
actively engaged: spiritually-by introducing all sorts of relevant
associations-and physically-by walking around the wreckage,
gazing through the shattered windows, reading the texts in the
newspaper, concentrating on all the details whichever of my
senses deliver to me: on the sounds, the smells, the images,
temperatures, etc. Only one thing I fail to do: I do not act in
accordance to the moral depths of my thoughts and feelings.
For clearly, if one is aware of another person's pain and
struggle, one should try to free him from his awkward position,
to stop his bleeding, provide first aid, or, at the least, call an
ambulance.
One might want to argue that the failure in my treatment of
the victim was more complicated psychologically and involved
a reduction of the man's personhood. Yet I merely treated the
person as a persona and reduced, quite properly I think, his
personhood to his role in the whole of the 'installation'.[16]
With works of art, it is the norm to refrain from moral actions
in this sense, and this, I suppose, is what it means to take up
an artistic attitude.
An objection might go like this: certainly we might try to help
the victim and yet notice the beauty of the thick blood, i.e.
without thereby leaving our moral stance. I agree, but fail to
see this as an objection to the thesis that taking up an artistic
attitude (such as we do when we approach something as a
work of art) involves, among other things, an abstraction from
the moral stance. I agree with the gist of the objection, that
aesthetic appreciation is integral to our everyday -moral-
perception of the world. Aesthetic appreciation is integral to
the artistic attitude too, but that attitude goes well beyond
mere attention to aesthetic properties, and, what is more: with
regard to art it is required.[17] It is this latter-practical-
requirement that should concern us here. Morally speaking, it
cannot be insignificant that art requires people to detach the
urge to respond which inheres their thoughts and feelings. The
exemplary moral situation-man confronts a traffic accident-is a
perceptual situation. The agent-perceiver and his object are in
one and the same space and time. Whatever enters his senses
reaches his mind synchronically. Within the exemplary moral
situation, all data provided by all of one's working senses
belong to the one spatio-temporal continuum one is in: if
nothing can be smelled, then this is in itself instructive as to
the things that are seen and heard. Also, persons encountered
in such situations will have rich and complex psychologies with
large temporal dimensions (memories of their past, projects for
their futures), which are expressed in their faces and attitudes,
as a slice of their lives, etc. Represented persons (or fictional
characters), in contrast, will have only so much mental life as
is bestowed on them by the representation, and there is no
second personal interaction between any represented person
and the beholder of his representation.
Basically, to allow the representation to make manifest its
particular meaning, a beholder has to acknowledge how his
beholding body no longer makes up the centre of his
perceiving, abstracting, automatically, from this exemplary
moral situation he is in.[18] Thus, abstaining from morally
relevant responses is part of the phenomenological specifics of
representation. It might, therefore, seem silly to admonish art
for requiring audiences to take up an artistic attitude; ought
implies can. Yet, art aims at providing absorbing experiences
with, often, a psychological and moral profundity. Yet it offers
these morally profound experiences while requiring an artistic
attitude, which requirement intrudes in persons' psychological
motivation for doing the good, in one's conscience. This is, at
the least, a moral paradox.[19]
6. Ethical autonomism
Ethical autonomism assumes that there is an 'artistic' variety of
the aesthetic attitude-theory, which refers the attitudinal
switch to the autonomy of art practice which turns it into a
requirement meant to allow individual works to provide us with
psychologically and morally profound experiences. The
requirement builds on the phenomenological characteristics of
our perception of representations, which already prevents the
anticipation of any direct response to the represented
worlds.[20] Yet, the requirement does not, also, prevent the
beholder from experiencing any of the thoughts and feelings
which would normally come up with one who was confronted
with the situation in real life.[21] Ethical autonomism does not,
as is often held against aesthetic attitude theories, forbid
audiences to have any personal desires or emotions with
regard to what a work of art means-as long as these are
appropriate to the work. There is no (theoretical) need to
transform oneself into a will-less, apolitical person without a
personality (Schopenhauer's "pure subject of knowledge") if
one is to appreciate a work of art, as long as the impetus to
instantly act according to them is out of the way.[22] Nor is
the artistic attitude reducible to mere attention, as George
Dickie has argued.[23] Our interests are problematic only when
they get too close to feeling satisfied by an anticipated
consumption of the represented object.[24] To enjoy a painting
that depicts a trout because one is hungry, to admire Henry,
Portrait of a Serial Killer because one rejoices in antisocial
behaviour, or pornography because one is out to find sexual
gratification (which, of course, is the appropriate way to treat
pornography): these are all paradigmatically moral experiences
at odds with the nature of representation and a fortiori, I
submit, of art.[25]
We find here an important indication of a possible criterion for
moral judgments of art. After all, taking up an aesthetic
attitude means treating the perceived as lying outside the
exemplary moral aspect of one's perception. The beholder is,
temporarily, to put his present surroundings on hold, i.e. he is
to suspend anticipating moral demands on his agency. This is
the crucial argument: assuming it to be morally significant to
relate to the world and to other persons in a moral manner, i.e.
to have moral thoughts and feelings and to act according to
them, when one gives in to the phenomenology of some art
form, one tampers with the psychological make-up of
conscience. This is morally relevant. Demanding the audience
to take up an artistic attitude, as any work of art a priori does
(even the ones that pretend not to), is a moral act. It is also,
of course, what allows the work of art to speak to one.[26] As
there is no need for the beholder to think about the
represented object's reality or to concoct a real context for it,
he is able to also take in the processes by which the work
guides the beholder through the 'life' of the work. Freed of any
such existential concerns, the beholder can inspect with care
the structuring of the material, the way in which the artist has
laboured it and the art historical, political, psychological, etc.
contexts that that manipulation appeals to.[27] These
processes of structuring, guidance and reference form a work's
performative aspect.
Works must merit our judgments, our aesthetic experiences
and attitudes, i.e. they must merit, generally, our thoughts and
feelings-irrespective of whether or not the propositions these
contain be morally meritorious or flawed. For this, works must
be coherent and plausible in whatever it is they consist in qua
art, i.e. in their relation to art history and, internally, to the
story (if any) they set out to tell.[28] Yet, in the last analysis,
works must morally merit, i.e. 'respect', the artistic attitude of
their audiences. For this, they must be respectful toward the
represented, toward the material used to represent it with
(including the material's relational properties), and toward the
attitudinal switch the beholder is required to make. Yet all this
is the subject matter of art criticism. Art criticism, therefore, is
a species of moral evaluation (of art).[29] In this article I have
presented a philosophical justification for treating art criticism
as a species of moral evaluation and an explanation of what
that amounts to. What to do with the examples I started out
with?
Intentionally dropping a bull from a helicopter transgresses
some moral demand of showing respect to animals, whether
alive or dead. It is obvious that many dead cattle were thrown
in big containers (sometimes shown on television) during the
foot and mouth crisis, but surely people did that because they
saw no other option. Flatz' action might have been condemned
on external, strictly moral grounds, 'we' should have not
allowed it to 'become art.'
Performances that play with real pain and the limits of persons'
tolerance for it, like the ones by Marina Abramowicz (cited in
endnote 16), can in principle be rightly considered worthy of
audience's artistic attitudes: the pain is not inflicted as a mere
means to some larger project, but forms the end of these
works. The thin line might be taken to be crossed, though,
when an artist actually damages her body, like Orlan does.
Then external moral considerations should induce us to
interfere and deny the relevant events' entrance to art
practice. It is one thing to comment on contemporary practice
in cosmetic surgery but another to ruin one's own person to
make the point, notwithstanding the immense power of that
gesture!
In most cultures morality also seems univocal on condemning a
lack of respect for human corpses (whatever principle is used
to sustain this condemnation). Günther von Hagens fails not
because he makes plastic puppets of real corpses (that could
be of great use for anatomy lessons; one of the few practices
that allow for a measure of disrespect for corpses) but his
treating these as if they are works of art (some are even made
in a clearly non-realistic, cubistic style). By turning his
plastinates into sculptures, von Hagens has them enter art
practice. He presents them to audiences who are required to
take up an aesthetic attitude, and are subsequently asked to
instil some mental life onto them-clearly not the mental lives of
the deceased persons. Morality must (I think) protest
vehemently.
Had the imagined car crash been staged by a group of artists,
containing a person really dying, those who understand the
distinction between art and life should refuse to treat the event
as art. Ethical autonomism thinks that it is perfectly justified to
argue from a moral perspective against limiting cases like
these: morality guards art's gates.
Ethical autonomism acknowledges, further, that once a work
has entered into art practice-by virtue of its conforming to one
of the accepted art forms-its lack of artistic merit entails a lack
of respect of its audience. Madonna's music comes to mind, as
does Silence of the Lambs. This realization identifies the source
for art criticism's normativity. We must not, however, make
the mistake of assuming that criticising works of art should be
done from moral points of view. On the contrary, I am held to
justify my critical assessments of Madonna's songs and Silence
of the Lambs by art relevant considerations. What is wrong
with the film, e.g., is not that it is about a psychopath, but that
it tells a flawed, sentimental, romanticising story about one.
And those who disagree with me, too, should produce art
relevant considerations. Such art relevant considerations can
refer to a work's moral contents, to its formal properties, or to
merely aesthetic properties, to internal and to external,
relational, properties, as long as they are referred back to the
works themselves. Art criticism, obviously, is food for another
paper. In the present paper, I have merely tried to establish
the proper order between morality and art criticism.
My position has an interesting consequence for the aesthetics
of creativity, of which I am unsure whether perhaps it is an
objection. It seems to follow that, since an artistically bad work
of art is morally reprehensible, it is also morally bad to create a
bad work of art. First, this would introduce artistic creativity
into the very class of everyday actions and would thus allow for
criminal offences here too; and second, it seems incompatible
with the standard view that artistic success cannot be
enforced. I see the point of this remark but remind the reader
that I nowhere alluded to the artist as the one morally
assessable. Instead, I devised a way to think about the moral
assessment of works, and merely argued that such an
assessment would have to assume that the work be conceived
of as a moral agent, the logical consequence of which would be
that it is the work that would receive the moral verdict (and its
consequences). The objection that ethical autonomism thinks
that all bad works are also morally bad derives its bite as an
objection from our fears for moralistic censorship and juridical
punishment. I fail, however, to see the pertinence of such
fears. Morality guards art's gates, but once a work has entered
these gates, art's moral judge is art criticism, and the biggest
punishment available to it, consists in pushing a work into
oblivion.[30]
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